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ABSTRACT
We provide a rationale for the observed pro-cyclicality of tax policies in emerging markets and
present a novel mechanism through which tax policy amplifies the business cycle. Our explanation
relies on two features of emerging markets: limited access to financial markets and limited
commitment to tax policy. We present a small open economy model with capital where a
government maximizes the utility of a working population that has no access to financial markets
and is subject to endowment shocks. The government's insurance motive generates pro-cyclical taxes
on capital income. If the government could commit, this policy is not distortionary. However, we
show that if the government lacks the ability to commit, the best fiscal policy available exacerbates
the economic cycle by distorting investment during recessions. We characterize the mechanism
through which limited commitment generates cycles in investment in an environment where under
commitment investment would be constant. We extend our results to standard productivity shocks
and to the case where the government has access to intra-period insurance markets. Lastly, we
conjecture that our results would hold as well if the government could issue debt subject to
borrowing constraints.
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Fiscal policy appears to play an important role in exacerbating economic volatility in devel-
oping countries. This view is supported by empirical evidence on the procyclicality of ￿scal
policy in developing countries. Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004), Gavin and Perotti
(1997), among others, have documented that governments in emerging market economies
tend to increase spending and reduce taxes during expansions; and the reverse during con-
tractions. However, the question of why a government would follow a ￿scal policy that
exacerbates economic volatility remains an open question.
We provide a rationale for pro-cyclical tax policy and ampli￿cation in this paper. We
study a small open economy model with capital where a government seeks to maximize the
utility of a population that has no access to capital markets. We show that if the government
lacks the ability to commit to future ￿scal policies, the best ￿scal policy available exacerbates
the economic cycle. In our model, the government￿ s credibility regarding taxes on capital in
the future varies with the current state of the business cycle. If the economy is in a recession,
the government has an increased incentive to tax capital in the future. This reduces capital
investment during a recession, amplifying and prolonging the downturn.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that a parsimonious model of capital
taxation with limited commitment can explain an important element of the ￿scal behavior
of emerging markets economies. This is done without recourse to political economy con-
siderations. Our model is simple enough to allow for a clear characterization of a plausible
mechanism behind the observed procyclicality and ampli￿cation.
Our baseline model has an economy with two types of agents: workers and capitalists.
The workers are risk averse, supply labor inelastically and do not have access to ￿nancial
markets. The capitalists are risk neutral. They invest in capital, own the domestic ￿rms and
can access ￿nancial markets. Our economy is small and open and capitalists can transact
at an exogenously determined world interest rate. In addition, there is a government that
cares only about the workers and uses linear taxes/subsidies to redistribute income. The
government is assumed to run a balanced budget. These assumptions generate a sparse
structure that isolates our mechanism. We show that the mechanism remains relevant in
richer settings.
The economy is subject to shocks. In particular, we assume that the workers in addition
to their net of tax wage income, receive a stochastic endowment every period. Before this
endowment shock is realized, capital is invested. The endowment shock generates a risk
that the workers cannot insure. The government plays the role of providing insurance to
2the workers by using a combination of taxes on capital income and labor income. A useful
expositional feature of the setup is that the endowment shock does not a⁄ect the marginal
product of capital. That is, the ￿rst-best capital stock is acyclical. This feature of the model
allows us to starkly study the role of ￿scal policy in generating investment ￿ uctuations that
amplify and prolong the business cycle.
If the government could commit, the optimal ￿scal policy (the Ramsey solution) does
not distort the capital margin in this economy (similar to Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), and
Atkeson et al (1999)) but does provide insurance to the workers. In the Ramsey solution, the
government completely insures the workers against the intra-period uncertainty by taxing
capital when the endowment is low and subsidizing it when the endowment is high. However,
given that the government lacks a ￿nancial asset to smooth consumption intertemporally,
consumption in the Ramsey solution will vary over time. Speci￿cally, if the shocks are
persistent, consumption will be higher following a high endowment realization.
The Ramsey insurance scheme exploits the fact that capital is perfectly elastic ex ante
but inelastic ex post. The ￿rst best program therefore imposes taxes on capital that vary
across states of nature but have an expected payment of zero (as in Zhu (1992) and Chari et
al (1994)). In the Ramsey solution, investment is constant. Note that to provide insurance,
the government drives down the ex post return to capital if the ex post endowment shock
is low. We observe this implemented in practice in many ways ￿higher taxes, failure to
pay out nominal promises on contracts, con￿scation, etc. Nevertheless, investors ex ante are
willing to bear this risk as long as the returns to capital are high if times are good.
What if the government cannot commit to the Ramsey plan? Given that the capital stock
is ￿xed for one period, the government is tempted to tax capital at the highest possible rate
and to redistribute the proceeds to the workers. We follow Chari and Kehoe (1990) and use
sustainable equilibria as our solution concept.
The best sustainable equilibrium for the government is supported by the threat that any
deviation will be punished by reversion to the worst sustainable equilibrium. Speci￿cally,
we show that the sustainable equilibrium that delivers the lowest payo⁄ to the government
is one where taxes on capital are at their highest possible level for all histories. To be
an incentive compatible allocation, the government cannot bene￿t by deviating from the
prescribed allocation taxes when facing as a punishment inde￿nite reversion to the worst
equilibrium. The best sustainable equilibrium can then be characterized by the incentive
compatible allocation that maximizes the utility of the government.
The government￿ s ability to commit to the Ramsey allocation depends on the gains from
3deviating from the promised consumption. When shocks are i.i.d. promised consumption
is independent of the previous state. This implies that in an i.i.d. world future capital tax
promises are independent of the current state. Investment may be suboptimal, but will be
constant.
A main result of the paper relates to the case when the endowment shocks instead have
persistence. We show that, given a shock today, the government has lower incentives to de-
viate from the Ramsey policy the higher the endowment shock was yesterday. Consequently,
distortions on the capital margin start appearing ￿rst after low endowment shocks.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. In a world with persistent shocks, the
current state a⁄ects the future promises of consumption. In particular, consumption in
the Ramsey plan will be higher following a boom as compared to a recession. However,
consumption following a deviation from the Ramsey plan is independent of the previous
state and so are the continuation values. Consequently, the gains to deviating from the
Ramsey plan and taxing capital are greater in any state following a recession. The best
sustainable equilibrium allocation would yield to this by prescribing higher expected average
taxes following a recession. This reduces the return to investment and therefore capital
stocks following a recession will be depressed. The asymmetry in distortions between booms
and recessions will result in investment levels that are positively correlated with the business
cycle. Note that these cyclical changes in investment are purely the result of the lack of
commitment: in the Ramsey solution, investment was constant.
We show that the best ￿scal policy under commitment also ampli￿es the cycle even
when the government has access to static insurance (i.e. it cannot borrow or save, but can
insure across states period-by-period), as long as ￿nancial contracts face the same commit-
ment problems as the tax policy. This highlights the importance of limited commitment in
generating the result.
We also consider the more standard case when the shock a⁄ecting the economy is a
multiplicative productivity shock. The complication that results is that now the ￿rst best
level of capital will vary with the state as long as the state is persistent, and this a⁄ects
the incentives to deviate directly (more capital implies more temptation to tax it). The
conditions under which distortions ￿rst appear in a recession now depend on the shape of
the utility function, production function and the extent of persistence. We show that these
conditions are likely to hold for empirically relevant speci￿cations. Lastly, we discuss the
case when the government has access to a bond. Tax policy continues to be pro-cyclical and
we present a conjecture that as long as we have the realistic case when ￿nancial access is
less than perfect and consumption is higher following a high shock relative to a low shock,
4we should obtain distortions and ampli￿cation similar to the case with budget balance.
In an important paper in the international business cycle literature, Kehoe and Perri
(2001) consider a model of risk sharing across two countries with limited commitment. Dif-
ferently from Kehoe and Perri (2001), we emphasize the role of the government in generating
ampli￿cation in emerging markets and derive an analytical characterization of the mecha-
nism behind it. In the literature on ￿scal policy, Talvi and Vegh (2000) study a model where
accumulation of surpluses by the government is assumed to be costly, and derive an optimal
￿scal policy that is procyclical. Alesina and Tabellini (2005) present a political economy
model where voters are partially informed about the state of the economy. Politicians who
face these partially informed voters behave in a myopic way and procyclical ￿scal policy
obtains.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we present the model with endowment
shocks and describe the full commitment solution. Section 2 presents the limited commitment
results. Section 3 extends the model to static insurance markets and productivity shocks.
Section 4 presents a conjecture for the case where the government has access to a bond and
Section 5 concludes.
1 Model
Time is discrete and runs to in￿nity. The economy is composed of a government and two
types of agents: workers and capitalists. Workers are risk averse, supply inelastically l units
of labor every period, and collect a wage. In addition they receive an endowment shock, z;
every period that follows a markov process. We let z 2 Z, and let zt = fz0;z1;:::ztg be a
history of endowment shocks up to time t. Denote by q (zt) the probability that zt occurs.













where c(zt) is their consumption in history zt.
Assumption (Segmented Capital Markets). Workers have no access to ￿nancial mar-













5where T (zt) are transfers received at history zt.
There is a mass of risk-neutral capitalists that supply capital, but no labor. The capi-
talists own competitive domestic ￿rms that produce by hiring labor in the domestic labor
market and using capital. The production function F is of the standard neoclassical form:
y = F (k;l)
F is constant returns to scale with Fkl ￿ 0.
The capitalists have access to ￿nancial markets. We assume a small open economy where
the capitalists face the exogenous world interest rate of r￿: We assume that capital is installed
before the endowment shock and tax rate are realized and cannot be moved until the start
of the next period. We assume the depreciation rate is 0.
The government in this economy plays a redistributive role.
Assumption (Redistributive Government). The government￿ s objective function is to
maximize the lifetime utility of the workers.
The government taxes capitalists pro￿ts at a linear rate ￿ (zt) and transfers the proceeds
































where w(zt) is the competitive wage at history zt.
















































where E [:jzt￿1] indicates expectation conditional on history zt￿1 and Fi denotes the partial
derivative of F with respect to i = k;l.
According to equation (2), the expected return to capitalists from investing in the do-
mestic economy should equal the world interest rate, r￿. Given the additive nature of the
endowment shock, optimal capital is a constant in a world without taxes. We now proceed
to characterize the optimal ￿scal policy under commitment.
1.1 Optimal Taxation under Commitment
Under commitment, the government can commit at time 0 to a tax policy ￿(zt) for every
possible history of shocks zt. This plan is announced before the initial capital stock is

















































































By combining the workers and governments budget constraint and the labor choice con-
































We have used the constant returns to scale assumption and Euler￿ s theorem, F (k;l) =
Fkk +Fll. Taking expectations of the previous equation and substituting in equation (2) we























t￿1) = 0 (8)
The sum of expected endowment and produced output should equal the sum of expected
7consumption and payment to capitalists.
The following lemma helps in simplifying the constraint set.
Lemma 1 For any c(zt) and k (zt￿1) that satisfy (8), there exists a function ￿ (zt) such that
(7) and (6) are satis￿ed.
Proof. Just de￿ne ￿ (zt) as the solution to (7) for given c(zt) and k (zt￿1). The fact that
(6) holds follows.














Proposition 1 Under commitment, the optimal ￿scal policy provides full intra-period in-
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E [ztjzt￿1] + F (k (zt￿1);l)
￿E [c(zt)jzt￿1] ￿ (r￿)k(zt￿1)
)#
where zt￿1 evaluated at t = 0 refers to the initial information set. Notice that if ￿(zt￿1) is
non-negative the Lagrangian is concave on c;k. The ￿rst order conditions for the maximiza-





















8where the ￿rst condition implies that c(fzt;zt￿1g) = c(fz0
t;zt￿1g) for all (zt;z0
t) 2 Zt ￿ Zt
and the second condition implies that E [￿ (zt)jzt￿1] = 0
Proposition 1 shows that the government can insure all the intra-period risk the workers











In this purely redistributive model it is e¢ cient to set expected tax payments on capital
equal to zero, a result well known in the Ramsey taxation literature (Judd (1985), Chamley
(1986) and the stochastic version in Zhu (1992)). Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994) obtain
a similar result in a business cycle model.
A quick corollary follows,











for zt < z
0
t
(ii) If E [ztjzt￿1] is increasing in zt￿1; then ￿ (zt;zt￿1) is increasing in zt￿1:






E [ztjzt￿1] ￿ zt
r￿k
Since k is independent of zt and zt￿1, the results follow.
The government will tax capitalists and transfer to workers in recessions and transfer
from workers to capitalists in booms, in such a way that the expected tax burden on capital
is zero and the workers are fully insured intra-temporally. The government exploits the fact
that capital is ex post inelastic to allocate capital income across states so that worker￿ s
consumption is equalized. The ex ante elasticity of capital provides the necessary incentive
to keep average tax payments at zero. The results in this section tell us that a government
with commitment would not amplify the cycle through its tax policy, even though capital
taxes are countercyclical. Investment will be a constant at the optimal level.
We now turn to the important question of what is the best policy a government can
implement in the absence of commitment.
92 Optimal Taxation with Limited Commitment
Once the investment decision by the capitalists has been made at the beginning of a period,
for any possible realization of the endowment shock, the government would like to tax cap-
ital as much as possible and redistribute the proceeds to the workers. Thus, the optimal
tax policy under commitment might not be dynamically consistent. As is standard in the
literature, we model the economy as a game between the capitalists and the government
and use sustainability (Chari and Kehoe 1990) as our solution concept. We characterize the
e¢ cient sustainable equilibria of the game and show that investment and hence produced
output will display cycles.
We assume the following
Assumption 1 (A Maximum Tax Rate) At any state z , the tax rate on capital cannot
be higher than ￿ ￿
Let ht￿1 be the history of tax policies and endowment shocks up to the beginning of
period t: ht￿1 = f(￿s;zs)js = 0;:::;t ￿ 1g (we do not need to incoporate the capitalists
previous investment decisions, see Chari and Kehoe 1990). A government￿ s policy rule at
time t is a function ￿t(ht￿1;zt) that maps previous history into a corresponding tax rate
smaller than ￿ ￿ . A capitalist￿ s investment rule at time t is a function k(ht￿1) that maps
previous history into a corresponding capital level.
A government policy plan is a sequence of policy rules ￿ = f￿1;￿2;:::g. A capitalist￿ s
investment plan ￿ = fk1;k2;:::g is a sequence of investments rules. For any (￿;￿) we can
compute the associated consumption level of the workers after any history, called the con-
sumption allocation by c(￿;￿).
De￿nition 1 A sustainable equilibrium is a pair (￿;￿) such that:
(i) Given a policy plan ￿ and any history ht￿1, the associated investment rule under ￿,




(1 ￿ ￿(ht￿1;zt))Fk (k;l)jz
t￿1￿
(9)
(ii) Given ￿, for any history (ht￿1;zt), the continuation of the policy plan ￿ maximizes
the expected lifetime utility of the workers from t onwards.
We will focus attention now on a particular sustainable equilibrium.
102.1 The Worst (Markov) Equilibrium
Suppose that the government after any history sets tax rates equal to ￿ ￿(zt). Let ￿M be
the respective plan under such a policy. Suppose that capitalists always believe that they
will be taxed at the maximum rate and invest km(zt￿1) where km(zt￿1) solves r = E[(1 ￿
￿ ￿(zt))Fk(k;l)jzt￿1]. Let ￿M be the respective investment plan. The following then holds
Proposition 2 (Worst Equilibrium) The pair (￿M;￿M) is a sustainable equilibrium. In
particular, of all sustainable equilibria, after any history ht￿1, (￿M;￿M) generates the lowest
utility to the government.
Proof. To show that (￿M;￿M) is an equilibrium, note that if the capitalists believe that
the government will tax at the maximum rate in the next period, then investing km(zt￿1)
is a best response. Note that if after any history zt and any investment k(zt￿1), if the
government believes that the capitalists will follow the investment plan ￿M in the future;
then it is optimal for the government to tax at the maximum rate today.
To show that this equilibrium is a lower bound for the the government￿ s utility, note ￿rst
that in any equilibrium at any possible history we have that k(zt) ￿ km(zt). Given that
F(k;l) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿)Fk(k;l) is increasing in k, by taxing at ￿ ￿ the government can guarantee a
payo⁄ at least as high as the one generated by (￿M;￿M)
In this Markov equilibrium, clearly, the government will always set the capital tax rate
at the maximum possible level. This will generate distortions in capital investment in all
states of the world.
Let VM(zt￿1) be the payo⁄to the government at the beginning of period t after a history
of shocks zt￿1 under the equilibrium (￿M;￿M). We can use this function VM to generate
e¢ cient equilibria in a recursive fashion by following Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti (1990).
We turn to the characterization of the equilibria in the next subsection.
2.2 The Best Sustainable Equilibria
We can characterize the best equilibrium recursively as follows:
W(zt￿1) = max
k;c(￿)
























t￿1) = 0 (11)
u(c(zt)) + ￿W(zt) ￿ u(￿ c(zt;k)) + ￿V
M(zt) (12)
for
￿ c(zt;k) = zt + F(k;l) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿)Fkk (13)
and where V M is the value function of the government in the worst equilibrium as previously
described.
Equation (11) is the aggregate resource constraint of the government and the inequality
(12) is the participation constraint. One problem when trying to characterize the best
equilibrium is that the constraint set in the maximization above is not convex. The presence
of choice variables on both sides of constraint (12), implies that ￿rst order conditions will
not be su¢ cient conditions for the optimum.
However, since the Bellman operator in (10) is monotone, for a numerical implementation
we can iterate down to the best equilibrium with the initial guess for the value function being
the full commitment value. Subsection 2.5 describes the results of a numerical example.
However, before entering into the simulation, it is still possible to provide more information
about the optimal equilibrium analytically. We start by proving a Folk theorem.
Proposition 3 There exists a ￿￿ 2 (0;1) such that for all ￿ ￿ ￿￿ the Ramsey solution is
sustainable and it is not sustainable for ￿ 2 [0;￿￿)
Proof. First we show that if for ￿0 the Ramsey allocation is sustainable, then it is sustainable
for all ￿ 2 [￿0;1]. Note that the Ramsey allocation is independent of the value of ￿. Note
also that the Markov allocation is independent of the value of ￿ as well. Let ￿(zt￿1) be the
Ramsey value minus the Markov value and de￿ne by cR and cM the consumption allocations
under the Ramsey and the Markov plan respectively. Then we can represent ￿(zt￿1) as




Taking derivatives with respect to ￿ we get






for some a(zjzt￿1) ￿ 0. Given that u(cR(zt￿1)) ￿ E[u(cM(zt)jzt￿1]1 this implies ￿(zt;￿) ￿ 0;
and this that ￿(zt;￿) is increasing in ￿. So the participation constraint at the Ramsey
allocation
u(c
R(zt￿1)) ￿ u(￿ c(zt;k
R(zt￿1))) ￿ ￿￿￿(zt;￿)
is monotonically relaxed as ￿ increases. When ￿ = 0, it is clearly not satis￿ed for some z.
When ￿ = 1, it is clearly satis￿ed with slackness (the right hand side is minus in￿nity). So
there exists a ￿ 2 (0;1) for which above that ￿ the Ramsey solution is sustainable and below
it isn￿ t.
When the government is patient enough, the Ramsey solution is sustainable. As before,
this will imply a ￿scal policy that does not a⁄ect the business cycle. The interesting question
is however, what happens when the government is not patient enough to sustain the Ramsey
solution, nor impatient enough that the punishment equilibrium is the unique sustainable
one.
De￿nition 2 Let k(z) and c(z0jz) be the respective policy rules that solve the Bellman prob-
lem at state z.
The following lemmas help towards an answer.
Lemma 2 For any given state zt￿1 if the participation constraints (12) are not binding for
a subset Zo ￿ Z then c(zjzt￿1) = c(z0jzt￿1) for all (z;z0) 2 Zo ￿ Zo.
Proof. For given k the problem is convex on c. Optimality over c will yield the result.
So, if the participation constraints do not bind tomorrow for two states, the planner
will equalize consumption in those states. If consumption is not equalized across two states
tomorrow, it is because a participation constraint is binding. We have the following result.
Lemma 3 (Distorting Capital Down) The following holds,
(i) for any given state zt￿1,
Fk(k(zt￿1);l) ￿ r
￿
1Note, that this is after k has adjusted to the Markov level.
13(ii) if for some z;z0 2 Z ￿ Z we have that c(zjzt￿1) 6= c(z0jzt￿1) then
Fk(k(zt￿1);l) > r
￿







0(￿ c(zt;k))￿ ck(zt;k) = 0 (14)
Another necessary condition for an optimum is that
(q(ztjzt￿1) + ￿(zt))u
0(c(zt)) ￿ ￿q(ztjzt￿1) = 0 (15)
, (1 + ￿(zt)=q(zt))u
0(c(zt)) = ￿ (16)
This implies that ￿ ￿ 0. Using the de￿nition of ￿ ck (equation 13), we have that ￿ ck > 0.
Equation (14) then implies (i).
For part (ii), note that if c(zt) is not constant for all zt 2 Z at an optimum (by the hypothesis
of the second part of the lemma) then ￿(z) > 0 for some z. Given then that ￿(z) ￿ 0 with
strict inequality for at least one z 2 Z we have the proof of (ii) .
Benhabid and Rusticini (1997) have shown that in a deterministic closed economy model
of capital taxation without commitment, there are situations where capital is subsidized in
the long run, and the steady state level of capital is higher than the ￿rst best level. In our
case, with an open economy, such a situation never arises. The previous lemma tells us that
capital is always distorted downwards (taxed) and capital at any point in time cannot be
greater than the ￿rst best level. It also says that if consumption is not equalized across
states then, in an e¢ cient allocation, capital will be distorted. Now the question is, in which
states will capital become distorted? Let us ￿rst analyze a simple case, where the endowment
shocks are i.i.d.
2.3 The Case of i.i.d. Shocks
It is easy to see that if the endowment shocks follow an i.i.d. process, then the value functions
V M and W are constants. Then the following result follows
Proposition 4 (IC binds in high states) Let the endowment shock follow an i.i.d. process.
In an optimal allocation, if an incentive constraint binds for any z 2 Z, then it also binds
14for any z0 2 Z such that z0 > z
Proof. Suppose that an IC constraint is slack for some z2 but it is binding for some z1,
where z2 > z1.
u(c(z1)) = u(￿ c(z1;k)) + ￿(V
M ￿ W)
u(c(z2)) > u(￿ c(z2;k)) + ￿(V
M ￿ W)
Given that ￿ c(z;k) increases in z, this implies that c(z2) > c(z1). Now, create a new
allocation by increasing c(z1) and reducing c(z2) such that the expected consumption does
not change. For small enough change, this is incentive compatible. However, the new
allocation attains strictly higher utility than the previous one, which is a contradiction.
This is a fairly standard result. In an i.i.d. world, incentive constraints bind in the high
states. These are the states where the government is called to subsidize capital and what it
really desires to do is to increase the transfer to workers. However, as will be explained below,
this intuition is incomplete when analyzing the model in an economy with persistent shocks.
In an i.i.d. world the future capital tax promises are independent of the current states and
hence the current state should not a⁄ect next period taxes nor current period investment.
However, in a world with persistent shocks, the current state does a⁄ect the future promises
of taxation, and will a⁄ect the level of investment. This is where our attention turns to next.
2.4 Persistent Shocks and Ampli￿cation
With i.i.d. shocks, the current state of the economy did not a⁄ect next periods promises of
taxation, nor next periods expected endowment shocks.
In a world where the current endowment shocks are signals about the distribution of
endowment shocks tomorrow, the promises of taxation will be functions of the current state.
Whether the economy is in a boom or recession, this will a⁄ect the expected future state of
the economy and a⁄ect the tax promises the government will have to make to achieve full
static insurance and maintain an e¢ cient level of investment. How do these promises change
over the cycles? Is it harder for a government to make promises of not taxing capital in good
times or in bad times? How would this a⁄ect the business cycle?
We now make the following assumption that holds for the remainder of the paper.
15Assumption 2 (Persistent Shocks) The endowment shocks are such that E(zjz￿1) is
strictly increasing in z￿1.
Our main result will state that for any zt, the incentive constraint is more likely to bind
at time t; if the state of the economy was low at (t ￿ 1). A low state today thus signals
tighter incentive constraints tomorrow and will imply distortions on the investment margin
during bad times.
Consider the commitment solution. Consumption under full commitment can be written
as:
c
￿(ztjzt￿1) = E(ztjzt￿1) + F(k
￿;l) ￿ rk
￿
where k￿is such that Fk(k￿(z);l) = r.
As stated before, consumption at time (t) under commitment is independent of the
realization of the endowment shock, zt (perfect intra-period insurance).:
Autarkic consumption similarly can be written as
￿ c(zt;k
￿) = zt + F(k





￿(ztjzt￿1)) ￿ u(￿ c(zt;k
￿))
Under the assumption that the ￿rst best is implementable, the incentive constraints can
be written as
￿(zt￿1;zt) ￿ ￿(V (zt) ￿ W(zt))
If ￿(zt￿1;zt) is increasing in zt￿1 then as ￿ decreases, incentive constraints bind ￿rst in
states where the previous endowment shock was low. This is formalized below.
Proposition 5 (Distortion in Bad States) Suppose that ￿(zt￿1;zt) is increasing in zt￿1
for all zt. Then in an optimal allocation if k(z) = k￿ for some z 2 Z then k(z0) = k￿ for all
z0 > z.
Proof. The fact that k(z) = k￿ implies that the ￿rst best capital level is attained immedi-
ately after a z shock. We know from lemma (2) that consumption the period after a z shock
will be constant and equal to c￿. So, it is the case then that
￿(z; ^ z) ￿ ￿(V (^ z) ￿ W(^ z))
16for all ^ z 2 Z. Given the monotonicity condition this implies that
￿(z
0; ^ z) ￿ ￿(V (^ z) ￿ W(^ z))
for all z0 > z. So, ￿rst best capital is attained also after a z0 shock and k(z0) = k￿(z0).
When is ￿(zt￿1;zt) increasing in zt￿1? The following result follows directly from the
de￿nition of ￿ and c￿.
Proposition 6 (Persistence) ￿(zt￿1;zt) will increase in zt￿1 if and only if E(ztjzt￿1) is
increasing in zt￿1:
The intuition behind the result in the propositions is as follows. If shocks have positive
persistence, consumption in the Ramsey plan will be higher following a higher endowment
shock. Thus, the gains to deviating and taxing capital at the maximum possible rate ￿ ￿ will
be greater in any state following a recession. Consequently, the government is less able to
commit to ￿rst best taxes and capitalists expect average taxes to be positive. This reduces
the return from investing in capital and therefore capital stocks in a recession will be distorted
down. Since distortions ￿rst appear in recessions, capital in a boom can be undistorted and
at the ￿rst best level, while the capital stock in a recession will be strictly less than the ￿rst
best capital stock. This mechanism generates cycles in investment and therefore cycles in
produced output, as now the capital stock k(z) will vary with the underlying shock z.
We now turn our attention to a numerical analysis that illustrates these results .
2.5 Numerical Example
In this subsection we present a simple numerical example of the best sustainable equilibrium
that illustrate the ampli￿cation generated by the e¢ cient ￿scal policy. We consider two
discrete values for z: zH and zL. To solve the problem numerically, we iterate on (10 ),
where the initial guess W 0(z); is the value function for the case with full commitment. Since
the value in the case with full commitment will necessarily be at least as great as the value
with limited commitment, and since the bellman operator is monotone, starting with W 0(z)
we should converge monotonically down to the maximized value with limited commitment.
Given the continuation value W 0(z);the government chooses tax rates as functions of today￿ s
shock and the previous one: t(ztjzt￿1), such that it maximizes (10) subject to (11 ) and (12).
17This generates a new value W 1(z): We repeat this procedure until jW i+1 ￿ W ij < "; where
" is a small number.
Table 1 in Appendix B lists the values for the numerical example. Table 2 compares the
taxes under full and limited commitment. In this example, the ￿rst best is attained following
a high state, while the expected tax rates are strictly positive following a low state. Capital
is distorted in the low states and un-distorted in the high states. That is, now capital is
cyclical.
Figure 1 relates the ratio of the capital stock following a high state to that following a
low state to the discount factor, ￿: As ￿ converges to 1, the ￿rst best level of capital stock
is attained regardless of the state. The ratio accordingly is 1. At the other extreme, when
￿ converges to 0; the only sustainable equilibrium is the Markov (punishment equilibrium)
and the capital stock in each state equals the same constant. For intermediate values of ￿;
capital in the two states diverge, with capital in the high state always being greater than
that in the low state.
Remark If the capitalists are de￿ned to be foreign nationals, we can de￿ne the trade balance
for this economy as (z + F ￿ c ￿ I), where c is the consumption of the workers. The trade
balance is therefore the di⁄erence between the income capitalists receive (z + F ￿ c) and
the amount they invest. In the case with full commitment, investment is constant. While
18consumption is procyclical, it is still the case that the capitalists receive more on average in





, is pro-cyclical. In our numerical
example this correlation is 0:56. However, in the case with limited commitment, investment
is now procyclical. In our numerical example, the investment e⁄ect dominates and we obtain
a negative correlation between the ratio of the trade-balance to GDP and GDP of ￿0:19,
which is consistent with the data for emerging markets.
3 Extensions
3.1 Static Insurance Markets
An extension we consider is to determine if the government could have improved on the lim-
ited commitment outcome if it had access to static insurance markets. That is, suppose the
government can buy and sell insurance claims a(zt) with E(a(zt)jzt￿1) = 0: This insurance
can be used to smooth the consumption of workers across states within a period, but not
across periods. We show, that as long as the government has the same limited commitment
issues related to the insurance contracts as it does with the tax contracts, the availablility of
static insurance markets will not improve on the equilibrium outcome previously described.
That is, any welfare level that can be attained through the use of static insurance contracts
can be replicated through the tax and transfer policy.
Consumption is now given by
c(z
t) = zt + F(k(z









If the government deviates, it also looses its insurance claims
￿ c(zt;k) = zt + F(k;l) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿)Fk(k;l)k (18)
We can now state the following proposition.
Proposition 7 For any equilibrium with f￿(zt);a(zt)g there exists an equilibrium ~ ￿(zt) that
uses no insurance (~ a(zt) = 0) and delivers the same utility at any history.
Proof. De￿ne ~ ￿ as
c = z + F(k;l) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Fk(k;l)k + a ￿ z + F ￿ (1 ￿ ~ ￿)Fk(k;l)k = ~ c
19This implies
~ ￿ = ￿ ￿
a
Fkk
By construction, c = ~ c: Since E(~ ￿) = E(￿) capital stock is the same under both allocations.
The deviation consumption ￿ c(z;k) is unchanged. So the new ~ ￿ is an equilibrium delivering
the same allocation.
So, having access to static insurance markets does not change the incentive compatible
allocations available to the government, and the results in the previous section still hold.
3.2 Productivity Shocks
This far we have modeled the shocks z as an endowment shock. We now consider the case
where z is a productivity shock. The production function is
y = zF(k;l) (19)














































The main deviation from the previous set up is that now the optimal level of capital will
vary with the state zt￿1, as long as there is some persistence in the state. However, all the
previous Lemmas and Propositions, with the exception of Proposition (6), follow through
with small alterations to the proof. For instance, as in Proposition (1 ), when the government
has full commitment, workers are completely insured intra-period. Further ex ante taxes,
E(zt￿ (zt)); on capital equal 0 and capital is at its ￿rst best level. k￿(z) is increasing in z:
Proposition (6) changes because ￿zt￿1 (zt￿1;zt) needs to take into account the fact that
k￿(zt￿1) is increasing in zt￿1:






where k￿(z) satis￿es equation (21). As stated before, consumption at time t under commit-
ment is independent of the realization of the productivity shock at time t, zt:









Since there is more capital following a boom, in the ￿rst best case, there can be greater temp-
tation to deviate following a boom, since there is more to tax. ￿ c(zt;k￿(zt￿1)) is increasing
in k￿ ( ￿ ck (zt;k￿(zt￿1)) = ￿ ￿ztk￿).Proposition (6) can now be restated as follows.
Proposition 8 Suppose E(ztjzt￿1) is increasing in zt￿1. Then ￿(zt￿1;zt) is increasing in
zt￿1 if any of the following holds:
(i) The utility function is of the form u(c) = c￿
￿ with ￿ ￿ 0 and the expected capital share
r￿k￿(zt)
E(ztjzt￿1)F(k￿(zt￿1);l) is weakly decreasing in zt￿1:





Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition (8) provides su¢ cient conditions for our main result that distortions begin to
appear ￿rst in recessions. Since the expected capital share is simply the constant ￿ when the
production function is Cobb Douglas, condition (i) states that as long as the CRRA utility
function has a risk aversion parameter greater than or equal to 1, if the production function
is Cobb Douglas it is necessarily the case that capital is ￿rst distorted in a recession. In
the case when we do not require the utility function to have the CRRA form, then we must
place restrictions on the persistence of the productivity process relative to the curvature of
the Cobb Douglas production function.
214 The Role of Debt
An important ingredient for the ampli￿cation e⁄ect is that in the Ramsey plan, higher
shocks today generate higher levels of consumption next period. This cyclical behavior in
the level of consumption next period makes the Ramsey plan harder to sustain after a lower
shock, and distortions in the capital margin appear ￿rst after low endowment states. As
easily observed, the balanced budget restriction imposed on the government is fundamental
in delivering the cyclical behavior of next period consumption under the Ramsey plan. If
the government had access to inter-temporal ￿nancial instruments, it would smooth out that
variation. However, by restricting ourselves to the balanced budget case, we were able to
maintain su¢ cient tractability so as to highlight the mechanism behind ampli￿cation.
Consider now the case where the government has access to a risk free bond which it can
use to smooth consumption across time. With this instrument, in addition to the taxes, the
government can completely smooth worker￿ s consumption across time and across states if it
had commitment. Taxes will be counter-cyclical, as before. However, now, with promised
consumption no longer a function of the previous state, the government￿ s incentives to deviate
from the Ramsey prescription will be independent of that state. Consequently, distortions
will appear everywhere simultaneously.
Note that this result does not directly over-turn our previous results. It is expected then
that a situation where the government￿ s access to ￿nancial markets is not perfect, will also
be characterized by a ￿scal policy that distorts capital ￿rst in the low states and ampli￿es
the business cycle. Since the level of ￿nancial access of emerging economies is arguably far
from perfect, one can conjecture that the realistic case is somewhere in the middle between
budget balance and full access to ￿nancial markets, where promised consumption will still
be cyclical and distortions will still appear ￿rst after lower realizations of the endowment.
To clarify the arguments, we present in this section the case where the government has
access to a risk free bond and full commitment to both taxes and debt.











































22where b(zt￿1) is the level of assets accumulated at the end of period t ￿ 1: De￿ne ￿(zt￿1) to



















t￿1) = ￿Wb(zt;b(zt)) (25)
The envelope condition is,
Wb(zt￿1;b(z










Combining (25), (23) and (26) we obtain
u
0(c(zt;b(z

























If we assume ￿(1+r￿) = 1; from (27) and (28) we have that consumption is equalized across
time and across states. From (24) we have that capital is at the ￿rst best level and constant.
From the constraint (22), recursive substitutions of b(zt) and the law of iterated expec-


































is increasing in zt￿1; this
implies that b(zt￿1) is decreasing in zt￿1.





































which implies that b(zt;zt￿1) ￿ b(zt￿1;zt￿2) = 0 if zt = zt￿1 .
Note that in the case with persistence, the government in the Ramsey plan will dissave
in a high state following a low state and will save in a low state following a high state.
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It follows that in the Ramsey plan, the government taxes capitalists in low states and sub-
sidizes them in high states as before. Accordingly, taxes are counter-cyclical.
In the case when a high state follows a low one, the government borrows and subsidizes
capitalists. When a low state follows a high state, the government taxes capitalists and also
saves for the future. The feature that the government borrows in a high state and saves in a
low state is consistent with the evidence of counter-cyclical budget balances that is observed
in the data for developing country governments. With this policy, the government achieves
a perfectly smoothed consumption pro￿le for the workers and does not distort the capital
margin.
What about the incentives to deviate from the Ramsey plan? Suppose that following
a deviation, the government losses its assets and does not repay its debts. The value after a





























which is constant independent of zt and t. The gains to deviating from the Ramsey plan
at any state zt is independent of the previous shocks zt￿1, and the arguments in previous
sections do not directly apply.
Remark Note that this analysis of the incentive constraints only applies when ￿(1 + r￿) =
1. In this case, there are parameter values where the Ramsey plan is sustainable, and we
can ask the question (as in previous sections) of in which states the incentive constraints
would bind ￿￿rst￿ . However, when ￿(1 + r￿) < 1, the Ramsey plan would require a falling
consumption pro￿le, and it would never be incentive compatible. So when ￿(1+r￿) < 1, some
incentive constraints will always bind in any continuation game for any parameter values.
We conjecture that in this case, as the government would eventually always hit borrowing
limits, ￿scal policy would amplify the cycle.
To summarize, we ￿nd that at one extreme, when the government cannot borrow or
save, in the case with limited commitment, distortions ￿rst appear following a low state. At
the other extreme, when the government can perfectly insure consumption across time and
states, distortions would appear everywhere simultaneously. Consequently, we conjecture
that in the intermediate and more realistic case when ￿nancial access is less than perfect
and consumption is higher following a high shock relative to a low shock, we should obtain
distortions and ampli￿cation similar to the budget balance case. We do not however prove
this in this paper and leave it for future research.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have explored the question of why is ￿scal policy procyclical in developing
countries and under what circumstances does this amplify the cycle. Our explanation is based
on two features that characterize developing markets: imperfect access to ￿nancial markets
and high impatience rates that limits the governments commitment to its tax policy.
To provide a clear exposition of our mechanism underlying procyclicality and ampli￿ca-
tion, we considered a parsimonious speci￿cation in our benchmark model. The workers in
this model are subject to endowment shocks that they cannot insure. The government, who
25cares only about the workers provides insurance through the use of linear taxes on labor and
capital. The government taxes capital and transfers to the workers in recessions. To prevent
capital distortions, the government then taxes labor and subsidizes capital in booms. The
insurance motive then generates counter-cyclical taxes or pro-cyclical ￿scal policy. When the
government has full commitment to its tax policy, it is able to provide intra-period insurance
to the workers without distorting capital, by setting the expected tax rate on capital to zero.
In this environment, the capital stock is a constant.
It is when the government lacks commitment that we ￿nd that ￿scal policy can be
distortionary and investment varies with the realization of the endowment shock. We show
that the incentive to deviate in any state today depends not only on the realized state but
also on the path the economy experienced before arriving at this state. This result arises
because when the government is restricted to running a balanced budget, consumption in any
period is greater following a boom than a recession, as long as there is some persistence in
the endowment shock. Consequently, the gains to deviating and expropriating capital at the
maximum possible rate is greater following a recession. In this enviroment, the government
is less able to commit to not expropriating capital following recessions and distortions in
capital ￿rst appear here.
Since an important part of the ampli￿cation e⁄ect arises because a higher shock today
leads to higher consumption tomorrow, we discuss how the results would change when the
government is not restricted to running a balanced budget. We conjecture that, as long as
￿nancial access is less that perfect, and the government cannot perfectly smooth consumption
over time, our ampli￿cation mechanism should hold. We present a brief analysis of this in
Section 4 and leave the proof of the conjecture to future research.
26Appendix A: Proof for Proposition 14.
Suppose E(ztjzt￿1) is increasing in zt￿1; ￿(zt￿1;zt) is increasing in zt￿1 if any of the
following statements hold: (i) The utility function is of the form u(c) = c￿
￿ with ￿ ￿ 0 and
the expected capital share
r￿k￿(zt￿1)
E(ztjzt￿1)F(k￿(zt￿1);l) is weakly decreasing in zt￿1
Proof for part (i): We need to show that the di⁄erence between ￿rst best consumption








￿ c(ztjzt￿1) = ztF(k




￿ = u[zt (F ￿ Fkk + ￿ ￿Fkk)] ￿ u[E (ztjzt￿1)(F ￿ Fkk)]
to be descreasing in zt￿1:

























In the preceding equations we have used the utility function form, u(c) = c￿=￿:
Now, F ￿ Fkk = Fll, and as long as ￿ is negative, (F ￿ Fkk)
￿ would be decreasing in k.
Given that k is increasing in zt￿1, then (F ￿ Fkk)
￿ would be decreasing in zt￿1 as well.
Now, u(E (ztjzt￿1)) is increasing in zt￿1 . So, we need that
u(zt)
"





27be decreasing in zt￿1. Given ￿ < 0; and u(z) is negative, this implies






should be decreasing in zt￿1. Note that 1 + ￿ ￿ 1
1
s￿1 is decreasing in
Fkk
F , the capital share.
So, if the capital share is weakly decreasing in k then, u(zt)
"







weakly decreasing in k as long as ￿ is negative and the proposition goes through. A special
case is when the production function is Cobb-Douglas and the share of capital is a constant.































￿[(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿]) ￿ H(k
￿)
The preceding equation is a function of k￿: Since k￿ is increasing in zt￿1; we only need to




















0 (￿ c)￿ c￿) ￿ 0
This requires
u0 (c￿)c￿
u0 (￿ c)￿ c
￿ ￿ (30)
Since ￿ c > c￿,
u0(c￿)
u0(￿ c) ￿ 1; a su¢ cient condition is c￿









28A further su¢ cient condition is
(1￿￿)E(ztjzt￿1)






29Appendix B: Numerical Example
Table 1: Numerical Example: Parameters
World interest rate 0.1
Depreciation rate 0








Table 2: Numerical Example: Capital Tax Rates








[1] Abreu, Dilip; David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti (1990), ￿Towards a Theory of
Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring ￿ , Econometrica, Vol. 58(5),
pp. 1041-1063.
[2] Alesina, Alberto and Guido Tabellini (2005), ￿Why is Fiscal Policy often Procycli-
cal￿ , working paper.
[3] Aguiar, Mark and Gita Gopinath (2004), ￿Emerging Market Business Cycles: The
Cycle is the Trend￿ , working paper.
[4] Atkeson, Andrew; V.V.Chari, Patrick J. Kehoe (1999), ￿Taxing Capital Income:
A Bad Idea￿ , Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Vol. 23, No. 3,
pp. 3-17.
[5] Benhabib, Jess and Aldo Rustichini (1997), ￿Optimal Taxes without Commit-
ment￿ , Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 77,Issue 2, pp. 231-259.
[6] Gavin, Michael and Roberto Perotti (1997), ￿Fiscal Policy in Latin America￿ ,
NBER Macroeconomics Annual, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[7] Calvo, Guillermo (2003), ￿ Explaining Sudden Stops, Growth Collapse and BOP
Crises : The Case of Distortionary Output Taxes￿NBER Working Paper 9864.
[8] Caballero, Ricardo and Arvind Krishnamurthy (2004), Fiscal Policy and Finan-
cial Depth, NBER WP 10532.
[9] Chamley, Christophe (1986), ￿ Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equi-
librium￿ , Econometrica, Vol. 54(3), pp. 607-622.
[10] Chari, V. V.; Lawrence J. Christiano and Patrick Kehoe (1994), ￿ Optimal
Fiscal Policy in a Business Cycle Model, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102 (4), pp.
617-652.
[11] Chari, V. V. and Patrick Kehoe (1990), ￿ Sustainable Plans￿Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 98, pp. 783-802.
[12] Chari, V.V and Patrick Kehoe (1999), ￿Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy￿ , in
the Handbook of Macroeconomics, Volume 1C. Edited by John Taylor and Michael
Woodford. Elsevier.
31[13] Judd, Kenneth L. (1985), ￿ Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight
Model￿ , Journal of Public Economics, Vol 28, pp. 59-83.
[14] Kaminsky, Graciela; Carmen Reinhart and Carlos Vegh. (2004), ￿ When it
Rains, it Pours: Procyclical Capital Flows and Macroeconomic Policies￿ , NBER Macro-
economics Annual. Edited by Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogo⁄.
[15] Kehoe, Patrick and Fabrizio Perri (2002), ￿ International Business Cycles with
Endogenous Incomplete Markets", Econometrica, Vol 70(3), pp. 907-928.
[16] Talvi, Ernesto and Carlos Vegh (2000), ￿ Tax Base Variability and Procyclical Fiscal
Policy￿NBER WP 7499. Forthcoming in Journal of Development Economics.
[17] Zhu, Xiadong (1992), ￿ Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Stochastic Growth Model￿ , Journal
of Economic Theory, Vol. 58, pp. 250-289.
32